[Causation in the court: the complex case of malignant mesothelioma]

The aim of this paper is to carry out an analysis of the legal evolution in Italy of the assessment of causation i.e. cause and effect, in oncological diseases, a question taken into consideration by the High Court almost exclusively with reference to pleural mesothelioma. The most debated question when defining the causal association between asbestos exposure and mesothelioma is the possible role that any multiple potentially causative exposures could assume in the induction and development of the disease, and in particular the role of any asbestos exposure over the successive employment periods. Indeed, this is a subject on which, to date, no agreement has yet been reached in scientific doctrine: these divergences bear important practical significance from a legal point of view, since sustaining one thesis or another may constitute determining factors when ascertaining responsibility for individuals who, in the past, had decisional statuses in the workplace. Jurisprudence in the High Court took on an oscillating position on this question as from the early 2000s, which was divided into those who sustained the thesis of the relevance of any asbestos exposure over the successive employment periods and those who were of a different opinion, i.e. only the first exposure period has relevant causative effect. The point under discussion concerns, in particular, the adequacy of a probabilistic law only governing such a question. An important turning point was made in the year 2010 when two sentences were announced in the High Court, reiterating, in strict compliance with the principles affirmed by the United Sections in 2002, that a judge cannot, and must not, be satisfied with a general causation, but must rather reach a judgment on the basis of an individual causation. In particular, not only did the second of these two sentences recognise the multifactorial nature of mesothelioma, something which had almost always been denied in jurisprudence in the past, but it also established some very clear legal principles of law. Essentially, when ascertaining the causation, a judge should verify whether or not there is a sufficiently well established scientific law covering the question and whether such a law is universal or probabilistic. Should the latter be the case, then it is necessary to establish if the accelerating effect has been determined in the case in question, on the basis of the factual acquisitions. We must now wait for the concrete application of these principles by juridical bodies.