Mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza: the dilemma of dual-use research

Robert G Webster1

  • 1Division of Virology, Department of Infectious Diseases, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, USA. robert.webster@stjude.org

Mbio
|February 2, 2012
PubMed

Insights

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity recommended restricting H5N1 influenza virus research publication due to biosecurity risks. This decision balances scientific openness with public health protection in a new era of life sciences research.

Area of Science:

  • Virology
  • Biosecurity
  • Public Health Policy

Background:

  • The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) addressed the publication of research on mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza virus.
  • Dual-use research concerns were raised regarding the potential risks and benefits of disseminating such findings.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To evaluate the NSABB's recommendation to restrict publication of H5N1 research.
  • To analyze the balance between scientific transparency and biosecurity imperatives.

Main Methods:

  • Review of NSABB's recommendation and dual-use considerations.
  • Analysis of potential risks (e.g., 50% human mortality) versus benefits (e.g., vaccine development).

Main Results:

  • NSABB recommended restricting publication due to significant biosecurity risks outweighing immediate scientific benefits.
  • The decision acknowledges potential benefits like early detection and control strategies for H5N1.

Conclusions:

  • The research ushers in a new era for life sciences, necessitating careful consideration of research conditions.
  • Balancing the principle of full information release with public health protection is a critical challenge for the research community.