Voluntary consent: why a value-neutral concept won't work.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Bioethics
• Moral Philosophy

Background:

• The concept of voluntariness in consent is debated, with some viewing it as value-neutral.
• A value-neutral approach defines involuntariness based on controlling influences or lack of alternatives.
• This perspective faces challenges in explaining the invalidity of consent in various contexts.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the value-neutral conception of voluntariness.
• To propose and defend a moralized account of voluntariness.
• To reassess concerns regarding the voluntariness of consent in research participation.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Examination of existing theories of voluntariness.
• Application of the proposed moralized account to case studies of consent.

Main Results:

• A value-neutral conception of voluntariness is insufficient to account for the invalidity of consent.
• A moralized account of voluntariness provides a more robust framework for understanding consent.
• The proposed framework suggests that many common concerns about research consent voluntariness may be overstated.

Conclusions:

• The prevailing value-neutral understanding of voluntariness requires revision.
• A moralized approach to voluntariness is essential for a comprehensive theory of consent.
• Re-evaluating voluntariness in research consent may refine ethical oversight and participant protection.