A plea for virtue in ethics

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). The current authors suggest that Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) presumed that the only ethical theories available for grounding decision-making models are of the rational, neoliberal variety. Rogerson et al stated, "Contextual, interpersonal, and intuitive factors are inextricably linked and inexorably influential in the process of ethical decision making. Ethical theory would benefit from encompassing these subtle yet powerful forces" (Rogerson et al., 2011, p. 616). They sought to augment these models with a cluster of contextual considerations, appending to them accounts of emotion, context, and intuition. First, notwithstanding the theories attributed to (the caricature of) Kant and his ilk, there are several ethical theories that include an account of what Rogerson et al. (2011) consider to be "nonrational" processes. From feminist theories to narrative ethics, sophisticated contextual theories have been developed and are readily available. Second, we question whether thick contextual considerations can simply be tacked on to extant models of decision making originally built upon a philosophical foundation that assumes a rational, autonomous agent who deliberates independently and logically.