Getting rid of interventions

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Causal Inference
• Metaphysics

Background:

• James Woodward's interventionist account defines causation via possible interventions.
• This account hinges on interventions being merely logically possible.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critique the necessity and adequacy of merely logically possible interventions in Woodward's theory.
• To argue for the dispensability of such interventions for semantic accounts of causation.
• To demonstrate the inadequacy of interventionist counterfactuals when merely logically possible interventions are maintained.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of Woodward's interventionist theory of causation.
• Examination of the modal character of interventions.
• Comparison with counterfactual theories of causation.

Main Results:

• Merely logically possible interventions are dispensable for defining the meaning of causal statements.
• The interventionist theory collapses into a counterfactual theory if these interventions are dispensable.
• Maintaining merely logically possible interventions leads to inadequate evaluation of interventionist counterfactuals.

Conclusions:

• Woodward's interventionist theory of causation is not tenable as a distinct theory.
• The reliance on merely logically possible interventions renders the theory inadequate.
• Explicating causal concepts and truth-conditions necessitates discarding Woodwardian interventions.