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Related Experiment Video

Updated: May 20, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm

Published on: October 20, 2022

The hard problem of cooperation.

Kimmo Eriksson1, Pontus Strimling

  • 1Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. kimmo.eriksson@mdh.se

Plos One
|July 14, 2012
PubMed
Summary
This summary is machine-generated.

Institutions can solve the "hard problem of cooperation" by imposing rules and high punishments. However, groups, especially non-cooperative ones, may reject these institutions if given the choice to vote on them.

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The HoneyComb Paradigm for Research on Collective Human Behavior
06:48

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Published on: January 19, 2019

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Last Updated: May 20, 2026

The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
06:18

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Published on: October 20, 2022

The HoneyComb Paradigm for Research on Collective Human Behavior
06:48

The HoneyComb Paradigm for Research on Collective Human Behavior

Published on: January 19, 2019

Area of Science:

  • Social Sciences
  • Behavioral Economics
  • Game Theory

Background:

  • The
  • hard problem of cooperation
  • is achieving high cooperation in groups with non-cooperative individuals.
  • Institutions with monitoring and sanctions are potential solutions.
  • Individual variation in cooperative inclinations is a key factor.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate if institutions can solve the hard problem of cooperation.
  • To determine the impact of imposed versus group-voted institutions on cooperation.
  • To analyze the role of monitoring, sanctions, and rule-setting in cooperative behavior.

Main Methods:

  • Laboratory experiment using a public goods game.
  • Participants were divided into homogeneous groups of cooperative or non-cooperative types.
  • Groups played the game under institutions with varying rules, monitoring, rewards, and punishments, including the option to change rules via voting.

Main Results:

  • Imposed institutions with high punishments and rules for high contributions led to high payoffs for all groups.
  • Non-cooperative groups benefited most from these imposed institutions but voted against them when given the choice.
  • Groups voted down beneficial institutions more often when rule changes were possible, particularly non-cooperative groups.

Conclusions:

  • Institutions can effectively solve the hard problem of cooperation when imposed.
  • The ability for groups to vote on institutions can undermine their effectiveness, especially with non-cooperative members.
  • Institutional design and the degree of group autonomy are critical determinants of cooperative behavior.