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Dynamic equilibria in an epidemic model with voluntary vaccinations
Frederick H Chen1, Allin Cottrell
1Department of Economics, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA. chenfh@wfu.edu
Individual vaccination decisions in epidemic models depend on perceived costs and benefits. Low vaccine efficacy can lead to multiple outcomes, influenced by public expectations rather than initial conditions.
Area of Science:
- Epidemiology
- Mathematical Biology
- Public Health
Background:
- Voluntary vaccination dynamics are crucial for epidemic control.
- Individual decisions to vaccinate are often based on cost-benefit analyses.
Purpose of the Study:
- To analyze the dynamics of an epidemic model incorporating voluntary vaccination decisions.
- To investigate the impact of individual economic/game-theoretic approaches on vaccination behavior and epidemic spread.
Main Methods:
- Modeling individual vaccination decisions using a game-theoretic approach.
- Analyzing the resulting epidemic model for steady-state and periodic equilibria.
Main Results:
- Demonstrated coexistence of multiple steady-state and periodic equilibria when vaccine efficacy is low.
- Showed that in cases of multiple steady states, outcomes can depend on agents' expectations, not just initial conditions.
Conclusions:
- Individual cost-benefit assessments of vaccination can lead to complex epidemic dynamics.
- Expectations play a significant role in determining epidemic trajectories when multiple equilibria exist, especially with low vaccine efficacy.
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