Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Moral Psychology
• Neuroscience

Background:

• Influential dual-process models posit moral judgment arises from rapid, affect-laden, and slower, deliberative processes.
• Conflicts between these processes are thought to increase decision time for resolution.
• Deontological principles, prohibiting intentional harm, are presumed to evoke negative affect, biasing early judgments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To test a dual-process model of moral judgment using decision time and consensus as conflict measures.
• To investigate the role of deontological violations in moral decision-making speed and conflict.
• To examine the influence of affect on early moral judgments.

Main Methods:

• Three experiments were conducted, classifying moral dilemmas by decision time, consensus, and deontological criteria.
• Experiment 1 manipulated decision time (unlimited vs. reduced) for moral dilemmas.
• Experiment 2 assessed decision consistency under time constraints and no constraints.
• Experiment 3 manipulated affect by having participants rate visual stimuli before making moral judgments.

Main Results:

• Reducing decision time decreased utilitarian judgments, but dilemmas with more deontological violations had faster decision times.
• Deontological violations did not predict decisional conflict profiles.
• Positive affect induction increased deontological decisions, contrary to predictions that negative affect or cognitive tasks would mitigate this.

Conclusions:

• Early moral judgments are influenced by affect, supporting a role for emotion in rapid decision-making.
• The findings contradict the model's predictions regarding deontological violations predicting early judgment differences.
• Engaging in tasks inconsistent with negative emotional responses does not diminish their impact on moral judgments.