Law, reproduction, and disability: fatally 'handicapped'?

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Medical Law
• Disability Studies

Background:

• Section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967 in Great Britain, the disability ground, is a source of significant controversy.
• Recent legal challenges highlight public and governmental interest in detailed statistics regarding abortions for foetal abnormality, especially post-24 weeks gestation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate and reject the legitimacy of the disability ground (s.1(1)(d)) in British abortion law.
• To propose alternative legislative frameworks for addressing issues related to abortion based on foetal abnormality.
• To examine the broader implications of s.1(1)(d) on reproductive choices and the societal framing of disability.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of Section 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967.
• Review of legal precedents and controversies surrounding abortion statistics.
• Examination of disability studies literature.
• Analysis of the impact of s.1(1)(d) on other reproductive technologies like preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).

Main Results:

• The disability ground (s.1(1)(d)) is found to be problematic, problematically emphasizing physical aspects of disability.
• This section has a presumptive effect on reproductive choices, particularly following prenatal screening.
• The controversy surrounding s.1(1)(d) is disproportionate to the low numbers of abortions performed on these grounds, yet its impact is far-reaching.

Conclusions:

• Section 1(1)(d) is a legislative relic of an overly medicalized approach to disability and abortion.
• Legislative reform is necessary to address the ethical and societal issues raised by the disability ground.
• Alternative legislative approaches are needed to better reflect contemporary understandings of disability and reproductive autonomy.