Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Moral Psychology

Background:

• Individuals face a conflict between short-term desires (e.g., cheating) and long-term interests (e.g., acting fairly).
• This conflict can be framed as a self-control problem, requiring strategies to manage impulses.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a framework for understanding and resolving the self-control problem inherent in ethical decision-making.
• To explore the application of game theory, specifically the repeated prisoner's dilemma, to moral choices.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis framing ethical dilemmas as a repeated prisoner's dilemma.
• Interpreting individual choices as predictive of future behavior within an intertemporal cooperation model.

Main Results:

• Short-term impulses to cheat are identified as a self-control problem.
• Viewing ethical choices within a repeated prisoner's dilemma structure provides an effective solution.
• Moral choice is understood as a product of self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation.

Conclusions:

• Ethical behavior can be sustained through a framework of ongoing cooperation and mutual expectation.
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma model offers insights into the psychological mechanisms underlying moral decision-making.
• Long-term cooperation, driven by self-enforcing contracts, underpins moral choice.