Epistemological problems in Cognitive Archaeology: an anti-relativistic proposal towards methodological uniformity

Cognitive archaeology (CA) has an inherent and major problem. The coupling between extinct minds, brains and behaviors cannot be investigated in a laboratory. Without direct testability, there is a risk that theories in CA will remain merely subjective opinions in which "anything goes". To counter this risk, opponents of relativism originally argued that CA should adopt a method of validation based on "indirectly" testing inferences from the archaeological record. In this paper, we will offer a two-part analysis. In the first part, we will discuss problems with the original anti-relativistic agenda. While we agree with the necessity of developing a rational methodology for this discipline, in our view previous analyses have significant weak points that need to be strengthened. In particular, we will propose that "indirect testability" should be superseded by a methodology based upon deductive mappings from networks of theories, followed by a plausibility-selection stage. This methodology will be implemented by adopting an extension of Barnard's (2010b) proposals for mapping hierarchical systems. In the second part, we will compare our methods with those currently adopted in the CA debate. From this analysis, it will emerge that some proposals in CA are inconsistent with our methodology and are incommensurable with those that are consistent with it. Furthermore, we will show that theories in CA can advance contradictory conclusions precisely because they have been developed using different methods. We conclude that a universal methodology, like that proposed here, is needed for CA to become more objective. It is also crucial for creating conditions for coherent and productive debate among different schools of thought in the field of cognitive evolution.