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Biosafety Recommendations for Work with Influenza Viruses Containing a Hemagglutinin from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96
Insights
This report details biosafety recommendations for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus research in the U.S. It emphasizes minimum Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) containment for HPAI H5N1 virus work to protect public and animal health.
Area of Science:
- Virology and Public Health
- Biosafety and Biocontainment
Background:
- Existing guidelines from CDC/NIH (BMBL) and USDA provide foundational biosafety recommendations for highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI).
- Specific focus on HPAI viruses containing the hemagglutinin (HA) from the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, including reassortant viruses.
- Recent NIH revisions (2013) enhance biosafety for mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1 viruses, aligning with broader recommendations.
Purpose of the Study:
- To outline essential baseline biosafety measures for laboratories in the United States working with specific HPAI influenza viruses.
- To provide updated recommendations for handling HPAI H5N1 viruses, including those derived from the Goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage.
- To ensure worker, public, and animal health protection during research involving these high-risk influenza strains.
Main Methods:
- Development of recommendations based on existing CDC/NIH BMBL and USDA guidelines.
- Incorporation of advice from the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee.
- Consideration of public input following a Federal Register notice (October 2012).
Main Results:
- Work with HPAI H5N1 virus requires a minimum of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) containment.
- Specific enhancements to BSL-3 practices are necessary for comprehensive protection.
- Handling of original clinical specimens containing these viruses at BSL-2 is permissible only if virus propagation is avoided.
Conclusions:
- Minimum BSL-3 containment with specific enhancements is mandated for HPAI H5N1 virus research.
- Biosafety Level 2 may be used for original specimens if virus propagation is not performed.
- All biosafety levels must be determined through a thorough risk assessment process.
Abstract:
The CDC and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) manual describes biosafety recommendations for work involving highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) (US Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], CDC. Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories, 5th ed. Atlanta, GA: CDC; 2009. HHS publication no. [CDC] 21-1112. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5). The U.S. Department of Agriculture Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses builds on the BMBL manual and provides additional biosafety and biocontainment guidelines for laboratories working with HPAI (US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Select Agent Program. Guidelines for avian influenza viruses. Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture; 2011. Available at http://www.selectagents.gov/Guidelines_for_Avian_Influenza_Viruses.html). The recommendations in this report, which are intended for laboratories in the United States, outline the essential baseline biosafety measures for working with the subset of influenza viruses that contain a hemagglutinin (HA) from the HPAI influenza A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, including reassortant influenza viruses created in a laboratory setting. All H5N1 influenza virus clades known to infect humans to date have been derived from this lineage (WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group. Continued evolution of highly pathogenic avian influenza A [H5N1]: updated nomenclature. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2012;6:1-5). In 2009, the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules were amended to include specific biosafety and biocontainment recommendations for laboratories working with Recombinant Risk Group 3 influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96-like H5 lineage. In February 2013, the NIH guidelines were further revised to provide additional biosafety containment enhancements and practices for research with HPAI H5N1 viruses that are transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets (i.e., mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1) (National Institutes of Health, Office of Biotechnology Activities. NIH guidelines for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Appendix G-II-C-5: biosafety level 3 enhanced for research involving risk group 3 influenza viruses. Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of Health; 2013. Available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_guidelines_oba.html). The recent revisions to the NIH guidelines focus on a smaller subset of viruses but are applicable and consistent with the recommendations in this report. The biosafety recommendations in this report were developed by CDC with advice from the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee, which is a panel composed of federal government subject-matter experts, and from public input received in response to the request for information that was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2012 (US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. Influenza viruses containing the hemagglutinin from the Goose/ Guangdong/1/96 lineage; proposed rule; request for information and comment. 42 CFR, Part 73. Federal Register 2012;77:63783-5). Work with HPAI H5N1 virus should be conducted, at a minimum, at biosafety level 3 (BSL-3), with specific enhancements to protect workers, the public, animal health, and animal products. Original clinical specimens suspected of containing viruses of this lineage can only be handled at BSL-2 if the procedures do not involve the propagation of the virus. An appropriate biosafety level should be determined in accordance with a biosafety risk assessment. Additional information on performing biosafety risk assessments and establishing effective biosafety containment is available in the BMBL manual.
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