Architecture of PFC supports analogy, but PFC is not an analogy machine

In the preceding discussion paper, I proposed a theory of prefrontal cortical organization that was fundamentally intended to address the question: How does prefrontal cortex (PFC) support the various functions for which it seems to be selectively recruited? In so doing, I chose to focus on a particular function, analogy, that seems to have been largely ignored in the theoretical treatments of PFC, but that does underlie many other cognitive functions (Hofstadter, 2001 ; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997 ). At its core, this paper was intended to use analogy as a foundation for exploring one possibility for prefrontal function in general, although it is easy to see how the analogy-specific interpretation arises (as in the comment by Ibáñez). In an attempt to address this more foundational question, this response will step away from analogy as a focus, and will address first the various comments from the perspective of the initial motivation for developing this theory, and then specific issues raised by the commentators.