"Top-down" effects where none should be found: the El Greco fallacy in perception research

Area of Science:

• Cognitive psychology
• Visual perception
• Philosophy of mind

Background:

• Recent research suggests cognitive states like mood and knowledge directly alter visual perception.
• Distinguishing true perceptual effects from influences on judgment, memory, or response bias is challenging.
• The

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate whether alleged top-down effects on perception are genuine perceptual alterations or confounds.
• To demonstrate a methodological flaw in studies claiming cognitive states affect perception.
• To re-evaluate the relationship between perception and cognition.

Main Methods:

• Utilized an art-historical reasoning error, the "El Greco fallacy," as a novel experimental paradigm.
• Designed experiments to isolate perceptual processes from post-perceptual biases.
• Examined alleged effects of morality on lightness perception and action capabilities on spatial perception.

Main Results:

• Demonstrated that several purported top-down effects on perception, including those related to morality and action capabilities, are not genuine perceptual effects.
• The "El Greco fallacy" was shown to be a viable method for revealing confounds in perception research.
• Evidence suggests these effects may stem from judgment, memory, or response biases rather than perception itself.

Conclusions:

• Alleged top-down influences of higher-level cognitive states on visual perception may be systematically overestimated.
• The "El Greco fallacy" highlights a potential widespread methodological issue in perception research.
• Findings challenge the direct continuity between perception and cognition, suggesting distinct mechanisms may be involved.