Reproductive choice, enhancement, and the moral continuum argument

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Genetics
• Moral Philosophy

Background:

• The moral distinction between therapy (treating disease) and enhancement (improving non-disease traits) is debated.
• A common argument posits that both promote well-being and are thus morally continuous.
• This perspective is often applied to genetic interventions for future individuals.

Purpose of the Study:

• To argue against the continuum model of therapy and enhancement for genetic interventions.
• To present three key reasons why the moral distinction between therapy and enhancement is significant for future generations.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of the therapy-enhancement distinction.
• Examination of the moral implications of genetic interventions.
• Critique of the well-being-focused argument for a continuum model.

Main Results:

• The argument for a moral continuum between therapy and enhancement is flawed when applied to genetic choices for future people.
• Three critical differences emerge: the conception of disease's badness, the accuracy of interventions, and distributive justice concerns.
• Disease avoidance is presented as more urgent and accurate than enhancement.

Conclusions:

• The continuum model is not an attractive framework for evaluating genetic interventions.
• Therapy and enhancement present distinct moral considerations, particularly regarding future generations.
• A nuanced ethical approach is required for genetic interventions, acknowledging differences beyond mere well-being promotion.