Peering strategic game models for interdependent ISPs in content centric Internet

Area of Science:

• Computer Science
• Network Engineering
• Game Theory

Background:

• Content-oriented networks necessitate evolving roles for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in content delivery.
• Interdependence arises among peering ISPs due to numerous content items and varying popularity, requiring refined caching and sharing strategies.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose and analyze a peering strategy for content exchange between interdependent ISPs in content-centric networks.
• To minimize overall content delivery costs through optimized peering relationships.

Main Methods:

• Modeling four peering strategic games to represent diverse ISP relationships (egoism to altruism, profit-individuals or profit-coalitions).
• Simulating these games to evaluate the price of anarchy (PoA) and communication costs.

Main Results:

• Simulation results quantify the price of anarchy and communication costs across different peering strategies.
• The study validates the impact of cooperative willingness and network structure on delivery costs.

Conclusions:

• ISPs must strategically balance intradomain content demand with interdomain peering relations for optimal cost efficiency.
• The proposed peering framework offers a method for ISPs to achieve lower content delivery costs in content-centric environments.