Introduction to the special issue: parsimony and redundancy in models of language

One of the most fundamental goals in linguistic theory is to understand the nature of linguistic knowledge, that is, the representations and mechanisms that figure in a cognitively plausible model of human language-processing. The past 50 years have witnessed the development and refinement of various theories about what kind of 'stuff' human knowledge of language consists of, and technological advances now permit the development of increasingly sophisticated computational models implementing key assumptions of different theories from both rationalist and empiricist perspectives. The present special issue does not aim to present or discuss the arguments for and against the two epistemological stances or discuss evidence that supports either of them (cf. Bod, Hay, & Jannedy, 2003; Christiansen & Chater, 2008; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; O'Donnell, Hauser, & Fitch, 2005). Rather, the research presented in this issue, which we label usage-based here, conceives of linguistic knowledge as being induced from experience. According to the strongest of such accounts, the acquisition and processing of language can be explained with reference to general cognitive mechanisms alone (rather than with reference to innate language-specific mechanisms). Defined in these terms, usage-based approaches encompass approaches referred to as experience-based, performance-based and/or emergentist approaches (Amrnon & Snider, 2010; Bannard, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2009; Bannard & Matthews, 2008; Chater & Manning, 2006; Clark & Lappin, 2010; Gerken, Wilson, & Lewis, 2005; Gomez, 2002;