The harm argument against surrogacy revisited: two versions not to forget

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Reproductive Technologies
• Family Law

Background:

• The "harm argument" traditionally posits surrogacy is morally problematic due to potential harm to the child or surrogate.
• Empirical research has diminished the popularity of the harm argument, showing little evidence of negative consequences.
• Existing criticisms do not fully address nuanced ethical considerations within surrogacy.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop and present two revised versions of the harm argument concerning surrogacy.
• To analyze whether these revised arguments withstand current criticisms of the standard harm argument.
• To highlight often-overlooked ethical considerations in surrogacy debates.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical analysis and argumentation.
• Development of novel ethical arguments based on existing literature and empirical findings.
• Critical evaluation of the revised arguments against established ethical frameworks.

Main Results:

• A revised "harm argument" focusing on the child's separation from the gestational mother is proposed.
• A second revised "harm argument" highlights risks to the child stemming from incentives to lower maternal-fetal attachment.
• Both revised arguments present significant ethical considerations often disregarded in surrogacy discussions.

Conclusions:

• The revised harm arguments offer important, though not conclusive, ethical considerations regarding surrogacy.
• These arguments suggest potential harms that warrant further attention in ethical and legal discourse on surrogacy.
• Further ethical and empirical investigation is needed to fully assess the moral status of surrogacy.