Related Experiment Video
Updated: May 1, 2026

Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting Propensity Score using the Military Health System Data Repository and National Death Index
Published on: January 8, 2020
Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Liran Einav1, Amy Finkelstein2, Stephen Ryan3
1Department of Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-6072 ( leinav@stanford.edu ) and NBER.
Abstract:
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on moral hazard." Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.
Related Concept Videos
Ethics and Bioethics
Standards of Care II
Ethical Issues
Ethical Concerns in Healthcare:
Models of Health Promotion and Illness Prevention I
The health belief model (HBM) attempts to predict health-related behavior in specific belief patterns. According to the HBM, a person's...
Hazard Rate
Hazard Ratio
For example, in a clinical trial...

