British army air corps accidents, 1991-2010: a review of contrasting decades

Accident investigation and review are important not only to attribute failure modes, but also mitigate risk, improve safety, and enhance capability. It was hypothesized that an interesting perspective on British Army Air Corps (AAC) rotary-wing (RW) accidents may be garnered by contrasting data from the previous two decades with a general operational (OP) shift from European theaters of conflict to operations in Southwest Asia.

AAC mishaps for the period from January 1991 through December 2010 were reviewed within an air safety management system. Accidents, defined by category 4 or 5 aircraft damage or death or major injury of personnel, were selected. Analysis was conducted jointly by a minimum of two specialists in aviation medicine.

There were 37 accidents that occurred in 6 differing airframes at an average rate of 2.5 per 100,000 flying hours. From 1991-2000, 25 accidents (9 OP) occurred with a rate of 2.8 per 100,000 flying hours. From 2001-2010, 12 accidents (5 OP) occurred with a rate of 2.1 per 100,000 flying hours. Aircrew human factors (HF) errors represented 84% of attributable causation for both decades. Spatial disorientation (SD) represented a higher proportion of HF-related accidents for OP flying.

Despite the perception of a more difficult OP theater for the latter decade, the overall rate and the proportion of OP accidents did not differ appreciably. Rather than theater-specific threats or challenges, it has been the longstanding and prominent player of HF error and specifically SD in OP flying that has remained entrenched in the causal chain.