Security analysis of phase-only DRPE based on known-plaintext attack using multiple known plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

Area of Science:

• Optical encryption
• Information security
• Cryptography

Background:

• Classical double-random phase encoding (C-DRPE) is an optical symmetric-key encryption technique.
• C-DRPE is known to be vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks (KPA) utilizing phase retrieval algorithms.
• Phase-only DRPE (PO-DRPE) is considered more resistant to KPAs than C-DRPE, but its comprehensive security against KPAs under varying conditions remains unclear.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the resistance of both C-DRPE and PO-DRPE to known-plaintext attacks (KPA).
• To analyze how factors such as the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and the gray level of the plaintext image influence KPA vulnerability.

Main Methods:

• Comparative analysis of C-DRPE and PO-DRPE security.
• Simulation or experimental evaluation of KPA success rates under different conditions.
• Varying the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs used in the attack.
• Testing with both binary and multivalued plaintext images.

Main Results:

• The study quantifies the security of C-DRPE and PO-DRPE against KPAs under diverse conditions.
• Specific factors influencing the effectiveness of KPAs against these optical encryption techniques are identified.
• The research provides insights into the differential vulnerability of C-DRPE and PO-DRPE based on image characteristics and data availability.

Conclusions:

• The resistance of PO-DRPE to KPAs is not universally sufficient and depends on specific attack parameters.
• Understanding the influence of plaintext gray level and the quantity of known pairs is crucial for assessing the security of DRPE techniques.
• This research contributes to the development of more robust optical encryption systems by highlighting critical security considerations.