Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Social Behavior Studies
• Network Science

Background:

• Pursuing maximum payoffs in social dilemmas can be risky.
• Conformity, driven by herding instincts, offers a safer strategy by aligning with the majority.
• Existing models often overlook the role of conformity in cooperation dynamics.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas.
• To understand how conformity influences strategy dynamics and cluster formation.
• To determine if conformity can overcome limitations of traditional network reciprocity.

Main Methods:

• Agent-based modeling simulating social dilemmas.
• Introduction of a fraction of conformist players into the population.
• Analysis of strategy domain interfaces and cluster expansion under varying network conditions.

Main Results:

• Conformity creates 'surface tension' stabilizing cooperative clusters.
• Conformists facilitate the expansion of cooperation beyond network reciprocity limits.
• The mechanism is robust across different interaction networks with degree-normalized payoffs.

Conclusions:

• Conformity can be a beneficial mechanism for resolving social dilemmas.
• Incorporating conformist behavior enhances the evolution and stability of cooperation.
• This finding challenges traditional views on the risks associated with conformity.