On the independence of visual awareness and metacognition: a signal detection theoretic analysis

Classically, visual awareness and metacognition are thought to be intimately linked, with our knowledge of the correctness of perceptual choices (henceforth metacognition) being dependent on the level of stimulus awareness. Here we used a signal detection theoretic approach involving a Gabor orientation discrimination task in conjunction with trial-by-trial ratings of perceptual awareness and response confidence in order to gauge estimates of type-1 (perceptual) orientation sensitivity and type-2 (metacognitive) sensitivity at different levels of stimulus awareness. Data from three experiments indicate that while the level of stimulus awareness had a profound impact on type-1 perceptual sensitivity, the awareness effect on type-2 metacognitive sensitivity was far lower by comparison. The present data pose a challenge for signal detection theoretic models in which both type-1 (perceptual) and type-2 (metacognitive) processes are assumed to operate on the same input. More broadly, the findings challenge the commonly held view that metacognition is tightly coupled to conscious states.