System-level protection and hardware Trojan detection using weighted voting

The problem of hardware Trojans is becoming more serious especially with the widespread of fabless design houses and design reuse. Hardware Trojans can be embedded on chip during manufacturing or in third party intellectual property cores (IPs) during the design process. Recent research is performed to detect Trojans embedded at manufacturing time by comparing the suspected chip with a golden chip that is fully trusted. However, Trojan detection in third party IP cores is more challenging than other logic modules especially that there is no golden chip. This paper proposes a new methodology to detect/prevent hardware Trojans in third party IP cores. The method works by gradually building trust in suspected IP cores by comparing the outputs of different untrusted implementations of the same IP core. Simulation results show that our method achieves higher probability of Trojan detection over a naive implementation of simple voting on the output of different IP cores. In addition, experimental results show that the proposed method requires less hardware overhead when compared with a simple voting technique achieving the same degree of security.