Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Clinical Psychology
• Neuroscience

Background:

• Philosophical discussions of free will often use psychopathology as an example of actions compelled by irresistible desires.
• This view suggests individuals with disorders like addiction lack the ability to do otherwise.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the conception of psychopathology as a state that eliminates the ability to do otherwise.
• To offer an empirically and clinically informed understanding of disorders of agency that preserves the capacity for choice.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of standard clinical treatments for disorders of agency.
• Detailed examination of addiction, including its neurobiological underpinnings.
• Philosophical exploration of agency and compulsion without reliance on psychopathological examples.

Main Results:

• Clinical treatments for disorders of agency implicitly support the idea that individuals retain the ability to do otherwise.
• Neurobiology of addiction does not equate to compulsion; it impairs behavioral control without extinguishing it.
• Removing the purported examples of psychopathological compulsion from philosophical discourse highlights the centrality of choice.

Conclusions:

• The traditional view of psychopathology negating free will is inaccurate.
• Disorders of agency, including addiction, are compatible with the ability to do otherwise.
• Choice and free will are central to our understanding of action and potent in clinical interventions.