Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas.

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Social Psychology
• Experimental Economics

Background:

• Cooperation is influenced by social and cultural norms regarding sanctions.
• Antisocial punishment can undermine cooperation, while altruistic punishment can support it.
• Cultural variations in punishment strategies significantly affect group outcomes.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the effect of sanctions on cooperation in two distinct game structures: a linear public goods game and a social dilemma with complementary actions.
• To investigate these effects in a cultural context known for high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe).

Main Methods:

• Experimental economics using a public goods game with a linear production function.
• Experimental economics using a social dilemma game where the minimum contribution determines the group outcome.
• Conducting experiments in Southern Europe, a region with traditionally high antisocial punishment.

Main Results:

• Antisocial sanctions detrimentally affected cooperation in the linear public goods game, replicating previous findings.
• In the complementary actions setting, sanctions significantly increased the provision of the public good.
• Participants punished less in the complementary setting, and sanctions altered conditional cooperation, leading to substantial welfare gains.

Conclusions:

• The effectiveness of sanctions on cooperation is contingent on the structure of the social dilemma and prevailing cultural norms.
• Complementarity in public goods provision can mitigate the negative effects of antisocial punishment, making sanctions a powerful tool for enhancing cooperation and welfare.
• Cultural context is crucial for understanding the nuanced impact of sanctions on collective action.