Validation in the Absence of Observed Events

This article addresses the problem of validating models in the absence of observed events, in the area of weapons of mass destruction terrorism risk assessment. We address that problem with a broadened definition of "validation," based on stepping "up" a level to considering the reason why decisionmakers seek validation, and from that basis redefine validation as testing how well the model can advise decisionmakers in terrorism risk management decisions. We develop that into two conditions: validation must be based on cues available in the observable world; and it must focus on what can be done to affect that observable world, i.e., risk management. That leads to two foci: (1) the real-world risk generating process, and (2) best use of available data. Based on our experience with nine WMD terrorism risk assessment models, we then describe three best use of available data pitfalls: SME confidence bias, lack of SME cross-referencing, and problematic initiation rates. Those two foci and three pitfalls provide a basis from which we define validation in this context in terms of four tests--Does the model: … capture initiation? … capture the sequence of events by which attack scenarios unfold? … consider unanticipated scenarios? … consider alternative causal chains? Finally, we corroborate our approach against three validation tests from the DOD literature: Is the model a correct representation of the process to be simulated? To what degree are the model results comparable to the real world? Over what range of inputs are the model results useful?