Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies.

Area of Science:

• Cybersecurity
• Game Theory
• Decision Making

Background:

• Increasing security threats necessitate novel protocol designs.
• Game theory is a key tool for developing and evaluating security protocols.
• Traditional models assume known adversary behavior patterns (selfish or leader-follower).

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate security protocol effectiveness when adversary behavior is unknown.
• To relax the assumption of pre-agreed strategies in game-theoretic security models.
• To analyze protector strategies when facing an adversary with unpredictable game choices.

Main Methods:

• Development of a simple game-theoretic model.
• Analysis of protector payoffs under uncertain adversary behavior.
• Examination of a repeated game scenario for adversary learning and belief probability analysis.

Main Results:

• Protectors can incur losses if they fail to consider the adversary playing an unconsidered game.
• The possibility of an unknown adversary game significantly impacts protector strategy effectiveness.
• In repeated games, protectors can learn adversary presence and adapt strategies.

Conclusions:

• Security protocols must account for unpredictable adversary behavior for optimal protection.
• Adapting strategies based on learned adversary patterns is vital in dynamic security environments.
• Game theory provides a framework for understanding and mitigating risks from unknown adversarial strategies.