Expressivism, Relativism, and the Analytic Equivalence Test

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Language
• Epistemology

Background:

• Contemporary philosophy grapples with context-dependence in language and thought.
• Distinguishing between relativism and expressivism is crucial for understanding semantic theories.

Purpose of the Study:

• To sharply distinguish MacFarlane's assessment relativism from expressivism.
• To demonstrate that relativism and expressivism represent fundamentally different approaches to context-dependence.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of theoretical frameworks for context-dependence.
• Comparison of relativism and expressivism using a specific philosophical test.
• Examination of the compatibility of different models with the concept of analytically equivalent propositions.

Main Results:

• Relativism employs a "bottom-up, building-block" model of context-dependence.
• Expressivism aligns with an "organic" model, drawing parallels with Lewis' epistemic contextualism and Frege's content individuation.
• The "building-block" model, unlike the "organic" model, permits analytically equivalent yet distinct propositions.

Conclusions:

• Relativism and expressivism are distinct philosophical positions with divergent models for handling context.
• The proposed test effectively differentiates between the "building-block" and "organic" models of context-dependence.
• Understanding these distinctions is key to advancing theories in the philosophy of language and epistemology.