Challenging the principle of proportionality.

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Bioethics
• Fetal Rights

Background:

• Alan Gewirth's Principle of Proportionality (PP) links agency to the right to life.
• The PP posits that rights correlate with the degree of agential capacity possessed.
• Two interpretations of PP exist: one focusing on physical constitution, the other on mental capacity.

Purpose of the Study:

• To examine the Principle of Proportionality concerning fetal rights.
• To evaluate the moral relevance of physical versus mental capacity in PP.
• To argue that fetal development before 20 weeks does not alter moral rights status under the most plausible PP interpretation.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of Alan Gewirth's Principle of Proportionality.
• Comparative evaluation of two interpretations of the PP regarding moral relevance.
• Argumentation for a specific interpretation of PP applied to fetal development.

Main Results:

• The interpretation focusing on physical constitution for agential capacity is deemed more problematic.
• The most plausible interpretation of PP suggests fetal development before 20 weeks is not a determinant of moral rights.
• The argument's applicability to more developed fetuses requires careful consideration.

Conclusions:

• Fetal moral status, under a key interpretation of the Principle of Proportionality, is not contingent on developmental stage before 20 weeks.
• The degree of actual mental capacity is more morally relevant than physical constitution for determining rights.
• Further caution is advised when extending this argument to later stages of fetal development.