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Published on: January 11, 2015
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation
Angelo Antoci1, Alessandro Fiori Maccioni1, Paolo Russu1
1Department of Economics and Management, University of Sassari, Sassari, Italy.
Abstract:
Using an evolutionary game, we show that patients and physicians can interact with predator-prey relationships. Litigious patients who seek compensation are the 'predators' and physicians are their 'prey'. Physicians can adapt to the risk of being sued by performing defensive medicine. We find that improvements in clinical safety can increase the share of litigious patients and leave unchanged the share of physicians who perform defensive medicine. This paradoxical result is consistent with increasing trends in malpractice claims in spite of safety improvements, observed for example in empirical studies on anesthesiologists. Perfect cooperation with neither defensive nor litigious behaviors can be the Pareto-optimal solution when it is not a Nash equilibrium, so maximizing social welfare may require government intervention.
Insights
Litigious patients act as predators to physicians, who become prey. Despite clinical safety improvements, malpractice claims may rise due to increased patient litigation, suggesting a need for intervention.
Area of Science:
- Game Theory
- Medical Malpractice
- Healthcare Economics
Background:
- Physicians face risks of malpractice lawsuits, leading to defensive medicine.
- Litigious patients seeking compensation can be viewed as 'predators' in a healthcare interaction model.
- Existing trends show rising malpractice claims despite advancements in clinical safety.
Purpose of the Study:
- To model the interaction between patients and physicians using an evolutionary game.
- To analyze the impact of clinical safety improvements on patient litigation and defensive medicine.
- To explore conditions for optimal social welfare in healthcare interactions.
Main Methods:
- Utilized an evolutionary game theory framework.
- Modeled patient-physician dynamics as a predator-prey relationship.
- Analyzed the effects of safety improvements on strategic behaviors.
Main Results:
- Clinical safety enhancements can paradoxically increase the proportion of litigious patients.
- Physician adoption of defensive medicine may remain unchanged despite safety improvements.
- The Pareto-optimal solution of cooperation may not be a Nash equilibrium.
Conclusions:
- Rising malpractice claims despite safety improvements can be explained by increased patient litigiousness.
- Maximizing social welfare may necessitate external interventions, such as government regulation.
- The current healthcare interaction model may not inherently lead to optimal outcomes without policy adjustments.
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