A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Science
• Evolutionary Biology
• Meta-ethics

Background:

• Moral realists propose moral facts are natural facts, discoverable through science.
• These facts are argued to be essential for explaining phenomena, supporting their reality.

Purpose of the Study:

• To present a biological account of morality's function.
• To identify a natural kind that could fulfill the explanatory role of a moral kind in naturalist realist theories.
• To assess if this natural kind is sufficient for identifying moral goodness.

Main Methods:

• Biological account of morality's function.
• Identification of a candidate natural kind.
• Analysis of the natural kind's explanatory power and sufficiency for moral goodness.

Main Results:

• A plausible natural kind, based on the function of morality, is identified.
• This natural kind plays a useful explanatory role in understanding moral phenomena.
• The identified natural kind underdetermines moral goodness, meaning it is not sufficient to define what is good.

Conclusions:

• The proposed natural kind is not a natural moral kind because it fails to fully capture moral goodness.
• The explanatory utility of this kind means no further moral facts need to be postulated for moral explanations.
• There is no compelling reason to believe in the existence of natural moral kinds.