Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Computational Social Science

Background:

• Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies establish linear score relationships in iterated games.
• Extortionate ZD strategies exploit cooperation for a score advantage.

Purpose of the Study:

• To experimentally test ZD strategies against human players.
• To compare the performance of extortionate and generous ZD strategies.

Main Methods:

• Laboratory experiments pairing human subjects with computer-controlled ZD strategies.
• Analysis of cooperation rates and average scores over time.

Main Results:

• Both generous and extortionate ZD strategies enforce unilateral reward control.
• Extortionate ZD strategies outperform generous ones in long experiments with known computer opponents.
• Human cooperation rates against both strategies equalize after learning.

Conclusions:

• ZD strategies effectively control outcomes in human-computer interactions.
• Extortionate ZD strategies can yield superior scores for human players under specific conditions.