Risk-Mitigating Policies and Adversarial Behavior: Case of Backlash

Area of Science:

• Game theory
• Political science
• International relations

Background:

• Adversary-defender conflicts are complex, often involving unintended consequences.
• Backlash, a reaction to policies, can significantly alter conflict dynamics.
• Existing models may not fully capture the strategic aspects of backlash.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a probabilistic game-theoretic model of adversary-defender conflict incorporating backlash.
• To analyze the costs of ignoring backlash in policy-making.
• To investigate how adversaries strategically induce backlash and the implications of time-lagged backlash.

Main Methods:

• Development of a static and a dynamic game-theoretic model.
• Probabilistic modeling to capture uncertainty in conflict.
• Analysis of strategic interactions between adversaries and target governments.

Main Results:

• Failure to account for backlash in counter-adversary policies can impose significant costs on governments.
• Minimizing backlash necessitates understanding its emergence and adversary's strategic incentives.
• Dynamic modeling reveals that time-lagged backlash is likely to escalate conflict.

Conclusions:

• Backlash is a critical factor in adversary-defender conflicts that requires strategic consideration.
• Policy-makers must anticipate and manage potential backlash to avoid costly repercussions.
• The timing of backlash is crucial, with delayed reactions potentially leading to conflict escalation.