Attitudes and Mental Files in Discourse Representation Theory.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Formal Semantics
• Linguistics

Background:

• Existing frameworks for representing mental states, such as Recanati's Mental Files, lack a clear distinction between mental file analogues and attitudes.
• Ninan's challenge questions the viability of acquaintance-based mental files in accounting for counterfactual de re attitudes.

Purpose of the Study:

• To present a concrete DRT-based syntax and semantics for representing mental states.
• To introduce a novel distinction between anchors and attitudes within a Mental Files framework.
• To defend the notion of acquaintance-based mental files against recent philosophical objections.

Main Methods:

• Development of a formal system based on Discourse Representation Theory (DRT).
• Distinction between 'anchors' (analogues of mental files) and attitudes (belief, desire, imagination).
• Representation of attitudes as referentially dependent compartments linked to anchors.

Main Results:

• A novel DRT-based framework for mental state representation is established.
• The distinction between anchors and attitudes provides a more nuanced model of mental representation.
• The proposed distinctions successfully address Ninan's challenge concerning counterfactual de re attitudes.

Conclusions:

• The presented system offers a robust and refined approach to the semantics of mental states.
• The framework supports the continued utility of acquaintance-based mental files in philosophy of mind.
• This work contributes to formal semantics and the philosophical understanding of mental representation.