Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity

The existence of cooperation is considered to require explanation, and reciprocity is a potential explanatory mechanism. Animals sometimes fail to cooperate even when they attempt to do so, and a reciprocator has an Achilles' heel: it is vulnerable to error (the interaction between two reciprocators can lead to an endless vendetta.). However, the strategy favored by natural selection is determined also by its interaction with other strategies. The relationship between two reciprocators leading to a collapse of cooperation through error does not straightforwardly imply that mistakes make the conditions under which reciprocity evolves stringent. Hence, mistakes may facilitate the evolution of reciprocity. However, it has been shown through the analysis of the interaction between reciprocators and unconditional defectors that the existence of mistakes makes the conditions for reciprocators stable against invasion by an unconditional defector more stringent, which indicates that mistakes discourage the evolution of reciprocity. However, this result is based on the assumption that the effects of cooperation are additive (payoff is linear), while the game played by real animals does not always display this feature. In such cases, the result may be swayed. In this paper, we remove this assumption, reexamining whether mistakes disturb the evolution of reciprocity. Using the analysis of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we show that when extra fitness costs are present in cases where mutual cooperation is established, mistakes can facilitate the evolution of reciprocity; whereas, when the effect of cooperation is additive, mistakes always disturb the evolution of reciprocity, as has been shown previously.