Two conceptions of conscience and the problem of conscientious objection.

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Ethics
• Political Philosophy
• Bioethics

Background:

• Schuklenk and Smalling argue that civic institutions cannot reconcile conscientious objection with liberal democratic principles.
• Existing definitions of conscience present challenges for institutional accommodation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose an alternative definition of conscience.
• To analyze the compatibility of different conceptions of conscience with liberal democratic principles.
• To evaluate the implications of a 'restricted view' of respect for conscience.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of 'conscience'.
• Distinction between a 'traditional' notion and an 'existentialist' conception of conscience.
• Critique of Schuklenk and Smalling's arguments.

Main Results:

• The 'traditional' notion of conscience, rooted in an objective moral order, successfully navigates the criticisms raised by Schuklenk and Smalling.
• The 'existentialist' conception of conscience, similar to the view targeted by Schuklenk and Smalling, does not avoid these criticisms.
• A 'restricted view' of respect for conscience presents both benefits and risks.

Conclusions:

• A traditional, objectivist understanding of conscience offers a viable framework for its accommodation within liberal democracies.
• The existentialist view of conscience is problematic for institutional application.
• Careful consideration of the scope of respect for conscience is necessary.