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Updated: Mar 14, 2026

New Variations for Strategy Set-shifting in the Rat
Published on: January 23, 2017
Alex McAvoy1, Christoph Hauert2
1Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada; Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
New autocratic strategies allow players to control repeated interactions in alternating games. These strategies, including extortionate and generous types, adapt to player asymmetries, even favoring subordinates in dominance hierarchies.
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