Is it objectionable to create a child as a carer for a disabled parent?

In his recent paper, Adam Cureton presents a compelling case in support of the right of parents with disabilities to conceive and raise children. Cureton argues that (a) caring for a parent with a disability may be beneficial for a child and (b) the creation of a child with the intention of him/her being a carer for his/her disabled parent is objectionable. This response to Cureton's paper will focus on the creation of children with the purpose of them being carers for their disabled parents. I will respond to Cureton on three counts. First, I propose that claims (a) and (b) are incompatible. Second, I will argue that even from a Kantian perspective it is not clear that creating a child as a carer is objectionable. Third, I will argue more broadly that the intentions with which parents bring children into the world are not predictive of the concern parents should show their children once they come into existence.