Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks

Area of Science:

• Wireless Communication
• Network Resource Management
• Game Theory

Background:

• Traditional secondary user utility focuses on signal-to-noise ratio, neglecting communication demand.
• Maximizing communication demand and spectrum utilization is crucial but under-researched in cognitive radio.
• Cognitive radio sensor networks (CRSNs) require efficient spectrum management strategies.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address the lack of research on secondary user utility from a communication demand perspective.
• To design a two-stage model for spectrum leasing and allocation in CRSNs.
• To ensure efficient and fair satisfaction of communication requirements for secondary users.

Main Methods:

• A two-stage model is proposed for spectrum leasing and allocation.
• The first stage uses the Bertrand game to model spectrum renting between primary and secondary base stations.
• The second stage formulates subcarrier and power allocation as a nonlinear programming problem solved via Nash bargaining.

Main Results:

• The proposed model effectively satisfies communication requirements of secondary users.
• The model achieves fair and efficient spectrum allocation compared to existing schemes.
• Simulation results validate the model's performance in CRSNs.

Conclusions:

• The developed two-stage model offers a novel approach to spectrum management in CRSNs.
• Considering communication demand enhances spectrum utilization and user satisfaction.
• The model provides a fair and efficient solution for spectrum leasing and allocation problems.