Ascertaining the causal factors for "ejection-associated" injuries

Determining the cause(s) for an ejectee's injuries is one of the more important and yet most difficult tasks associated with an ejection investigation. Selection of causal factors is often distorted by rumors and inaccurate teaching concerning how specific types of injuries occur and/or the consequences of using specific types of Aircrew Automated Escape Systems (AAES) and Aircrew Life Support Systems (ALSS) equipment. Unfortunately, aiding and abetting the selection of incorrect causal factors is the "strength-in-numbers"-type legitimacy that many of these factors have acquired through frequent usage over the years. Thus, if one should query the Naval Safety Center computer concerning either 1) how many ejectees under certain conditions and/or using specific AAES/ALSS equipment sustained specific injuries, or 2) how many ejectees received a specific type of injury caused by a specific factor, that computer will obligingly and non-critically provide numbers. Because those numbers are generated by a computer, they gain an overwhelming appearance of irrefutability in demonstrating the correctness of any assessment that conforms. Careful, detailed investigation (and also general statistical investigation), however, often has revealed that these accepted causal factors either cannot be applicable or are of extremely doubtful applicability for the specific situations. This paper discusses some of the recent results of investigating many of the accepted causal factors and some methodologies that might aid an investigator in determining the causal factors. Also discussed is the value of admitting to not knowing the causal factor and the harm that can arise from guessing or joining the crowd in stating a causal factor in the Flight Surgeon's Report (FSR).