Catch shares slow the race to fish

Area of Science:

• Marine Biology
• Fisheries Science
• Environmental Economics

Background:

• The "tragedy of the commons" in fisheries leads to compressed fishing seasons, causing ecological damage, economic loss, and safety risks.
• Catch shares are proposed to mitigate this by granting individuals rights to a portion of the total catch, theoretically ending the "race to fish".

Purpose of the Study:

• To systematically analyze natural experiments and test the hypothesis that catch shares reduce the "race to fish" in 39 US fisheries.
• To provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of catch shares in altering fishing season dynamics.

Main Methods:

• Utilized a natural experiment design, comparing fisheries treated with catch shares to individually matched control fisheries.
• Employed before-and-after policy change analysis.
• Estimated average policy treatment effects using a pooled model and a meta-analysis of individual treatment-control pairs.

Main Results:

• Found strong evidence that catch shares significantly extend fishing seasons across the analyzed US fisheries.
• The results are consistent with the theory that market-based management, such as catch shares, can effectively end the "race to fish".

Conclusions:

• Catch shares are an effective tool for extending fishing seasons and mitigating the negative consequences of the "race to fish" in fisheries management.
• The findings support the expansion of market-based management strategies in other fisheries facing similar challenges.