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Updated: Mar 3, 2026

Peering into the Dynamics of Social Interactions: Measuring Play Fighting in Rats
Published on: January 18, 2013
The dynamics of behavior in modified dictator games
Jeannette Brosig-Koch1, Thomas Riechmann2, Joachim Weimann3
1Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany.
Abstract:
We investigate the dynamics of individual pro-social behavior over time. The dynamics are tested by running the same experiment with the same subjects at several points in time. To exclude learning and reputation building, we employ non-strategic decision tasks and a sequential prisoners-dilemma as a control treatment. In the first wave, pro-social concerns explain a high share of individual decisions. Pro-social decisions decrease over time, however. In the final wave, most decisions can be accounted for by assuming pure selfishness. Stable behavior in the sense that subjects stick to their decisions over time is observed predominantly for purely selfish subjects. We offer two explanation for our results: diminishing experimenter demand effects and moral self-licensing.
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