Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

Area of Science:

• Comparative Psychology
• Animal Behavior
• Philosophy of Language

Background:

• A dominant perspective posits that human communication possesses an 'ostensive-inferential' or 'Gricean' intentional structure, distinct from animal communication.
• This view implies fundamental differences in the psychological states underpinning human versus animal communication systems.
• The potential absence of Gricean intentionality in animals suggests a simpler cognitive basis for their communicative acts.

Purpose of the Study:

• To challenge the prevailing view that animal communication lacks ostensive-inferential or Gricean intentional structure.
• To explore the grounds for expecting ostensive communication in non-human species.
• To evaluate the applicability of minimally Gricean models to animal communication.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of communication theory, focusing on ostension and inference.
• Examination of the cognitive prerequisites for ostensive communication.
• Argumentation based on the functional requirements of successful communication in non-human clades.

Main Results:

• Ostensive communication is argued to be possible in non-human animals, requiring only intentional address to an interlocutor.
• The cognitive demands for ostension are considered minimal and a functional prerequisite for effective communication.
• Ostension and the inferences required in Gricean communication can be separated, weakening arguments against animal Gricean communication.

Conclusions:

• The grounds for excluding animal communication from Gricean models are weak.
• A 'minimally Gricean' model offers a valuable framework for understanding the communicative interactions of many animal species.
• This perspective suggests a more nuanced understanding of animal cognition and communication.