Predictions, precision, and agentive attention.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroscience

Background:

• The prediction error minimization (PEM) account posits that cognitive processing aims to reduce prediction errors from sensory information.
• Attention is theorized within PEM as optimizing the precision of prediction error signals.
• Ransom et al. (2017) challenged PEM, arguing it cannot explain voluntary attention shifts.

Purpose of the Study:

• To refute the challenge posed by Ransom et al. to the PEM account of cognitive processing.
• To demonstrate that voluntary attention can be explained within a PEM framework.
• To re-evaluate the origins of voluntary attention in cognitive theory.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of cognitive processing models.
• Critique of existing theories on attention and prediction error minimization.
• Development of an alternative explanation for voluntary attention within the PEM framework.

Main Results:

• The challenge to PEM by Ransom et al. is shown to be unsuccessful.
• Voluntary attention shifts are not incompatible with the PEM account.
• The origins of voluntary attention are re-attributed to changing belief complexes.

Conclusions:

• The PEM account of cognitive processing remains a viable unifying framework.
• Attention's role in cognitive processing is better understood through belief-based mechanisms within PEM.
• This work offers a more robust explanation for voluntary attention, strengthening the PEM model.