How Not to Argue for Selective Reproductive Procedures.

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Disability Studies
• Reproductive Ethics

Background:

• Bioethicists often argue for a moral imperative to select against disability.
• This stance aims to avoid devaluing the lives of disabled individuals.
• Dan Brock's arguments exemplify this approach, framing reproductive choices as "nonperson-affecting harms" related to opportunity.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically analyze the ethical arguments supporting reproductive selection against disability.
• To examine the validity of claims that a life with disability is inherently worse or diminishes opportunity.
• To address objections raised by disability scholars regarding reproductive selection.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and ethical analysis.
• Critique of existing bioethical frameworks, specifically Dan Brock's.
• Engagement with disability studies scholarship on the value of life with disability.

Main Results:

• The study contests the presumption that a life with disability is inherently a lesser life.
• It argues that the concept of "nonperson-affecting harm" in reproductive selection is ethically problematic.
• The ethical justifications for selecting against disability are found to be contestable and fail to avoid significant objections.

Conclusions:

• The ethical requirement to select against disability, as argued by bioethicists like Brock, is not adequately supported.
• Assumptions about the negative value of disability and diminished opportunity require critical re-evaluation.
• Reproductive selection against disability raises ethical concerns that are not resolved by current bioethical arguments.