Children's developing metaethical judgments.

Area of Science:

• Developmental psychology
• Moral philosophy
• Cognitive science

Background:

• Human adults often favor moral objectivism but may adopt relativistic views when cultural differences arise.
• Understanding the development of metaethical judgments in children is crucial for grasping the origins of moral reasoning.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how children's metaethical judgments (objectivism vs. relativism) are influenced by cultural and group differences.
• To examine developmental changes in children's moral objectivism and their susceptibility to relativistic thinking.

Main Methods:

• 136 children aged 4, 6, and 9 years were presented with scenarios involving moral disagreements between judges.
• Children's metaethical judgments were assessed by determining if they believed only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be correct.
• A control condition examined judgments about disagreements on physical laws to differentiate moral from non-moral reasoning.

Main Results:

• Nine-year-olds, unlike younger children, were more inclined to accept both viewpoints (relativism) when an ingroup judge disagreed with an outgroup (extraterrestrial) judge on moral matters.
• This effect of cultural difference on relativistic judgment was specific to moral disagreements and not observed in disagreements about physical laws.
• Younger children predominantly exhibited moral objectivism, believing only one party could be correct.

Conclusions:

• By age 9, children begin to integrate culturally relative perspectives into their metaethical judgments, moving beyond strict moral objectivism.
• Early school-age children demonstrate an emerging capacity to understand that moral norms can differ across groups or cultures.
• These findings highlight a developmental shift in moral reasoning, where children learn to temper objectivist tendencies with relativistic considerations in social contexts.