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Invisible Trojan-horse attack.

Shihan Sajeed1,2, Carter Minshull3,4, Nitin Jain5

  • 1Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada. shihan.sajeed@gmail.com.

Scientific Reports
|August 23, 2017
PubMed
Summary
This summary is machine-generated.

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A novel Trojan-horse attack is nearly invisible to quantum key distribution (QKD) detectors. This attack succeeds at 1924 nm, posing a security threat to QKD systems.

Area of Science:

  • Quantum Information Science
  • Quantum Cryptography
  • Experimental Physics

Background:

  • Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems rely on single-photon detectors for secure key exchange.
  • Existing Trojan-horse attacks have been mitigated by operating at specific wavelengths like 1536 nm.
  • The security of practical QKD implementations against sophisticated attacks is an ongoing research area.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that evades practical single-photon detectors.
  • To compare the effectiveness of this attack against the Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) protocol at 1924 nm versus 1536 nm.
  • To assess the security implications of this 'invisible' attack on current QKD systems.

Main Methods:

  • Experimental implementation of a Trojan-horse attack targeting single-photon detectors in QKD.

Related Experiment Videos

  • Numerical modeling and comparison of attack performance at 1924 nm and 1536 nm wavelengths.
  • Analysis of detector noise response to bright pulses at different wavelengths.

    • Main Results:

    • The Trojan-horse attack was experimentally shown to be feasible and nearly undetectable at 1924 nm.
    • Detector noise response to bright pulses was significantly reduced at 1924 nm compared to 1536 nm.
    • Modeling confirmed the attack's success at 1924 nm, whereas it was previously unsuccessful at 1536 nm.

    Conclusions:

    • The developed Trojan-horse attack poses a significant, previously underestimated threat to the security of practical QKD systems.
    • Operating QKD systems at 1924 nm does not inherently prevent this specific type of attack.
    • Adoption of proper countermeasures is crucial to maintain the security of quantum key distribution.