Postnatal human genetic enhancement and the parens patriae doctrine

This paper explores the role of the state, acting as parens patriae, with respect to the future-looking technology of postnatal human genetic enhancement (PoGE), applied to minors by their parents or the state. Considering postnatal rather than prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) allows us to explore the putative obligations of the state with respect to actual persons, in contrast to future persons the subjects of speculative investigation in the traditionally studied case of PGE. Part I features PoGE, mostly by analogy to PGE and other (non-genetic) postnatal enhancements. Part II examines the nature and scope of the parens patriae doctrine, distinguishing between its protective and substitutive facets. I conclude, drawing on contemporary legal constructions, that: a) the state's interference in parental genetic enhancement (GE) discretion, under its protective role, should generally be minimal, reserved to extreme cases where grave harm to the child has been caused or is reasonably foreseeable; and b) since we cannot readily find parents obligated to genetically enhance their offspring, the state as parens patriae, under its substitutive role, will be respectively exempt from such duty towards state-dependent-children, save for certain GEs considered a sine qua non necessity, equally obligating parents and state to provide children with.