The Aviation Paradox: Why We Can 'Know' Jetliners But Not Reactors.

Area of Science:

• Science and Technology Studies (STS)
• Risk Analysis
• Engineering Reliability

Background:

• Modern governance increasingly focuses on technological risk, with reliability assessment as a key metric.
• The Science and Technology Studies (STS) literature questions the feasibility of accurately predicting ultra-high reliability for safety-critical systems.
• Publics and policymakers grapple with the risks associated with complex technologies like airframes and nuclear reactors.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the efficacy of reliability assessments in the nuclear sphere.
• To explain why predictive reliability calculations for new airframes are theoretically flawed but practically effective.
• To explore domain-specific engineering practices in aviation reliability and their potential application to nuclear energy debates.

Main Methods:

• Comparative analysis of reliability assessment methodologies in aviation and nuclear engineering.
• Examination of epistemological challenges in predicting ultra-high reliability.
• Case study approach focusing on airframe and nuclear reactor safety.

Main Results:

• Predictive reliability calculations for new airframes face fundamental theoretical limitations.
• Despite theoretical issues, aviation reliability calculations can be practically accurate due to domain-specific engineering practices.
• The methods used to manage reliability in aviation are not directly transferable to the nuclear sphere due to domain specificity.

Conclusions:

• Misgivings about the reliability of predictive assessments are justified in the nuclear context.
• A nuanced understanding of aviation engineering practices can inform nuclear energy risk governance.
• Domain-specific knowledge is crucial for effective technological risk management in safety-critical systems.